Washington's Department of Financial Institutions wants to strip Bitcoin Depot of its money transmitter license and ban founder Brandon Mintz from the money transmission industry for ten years. The regulator also proposes a $1.5 million personal fine against Mintz — in a Statement of Charges issued June 8, 2026, less than a month after the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and took its kiosk network offline.
The charges matter because they target the individual, not just the entity. Washington's regulators named Mintz personally as the company's "Responsible Individual" from December 2020 through June 2026, and the proposed $1.5 million fine, ten-year industry ban, and investigation costs are directed at him directly. With the LLC already in bankruptcy and its assets headed to auction this week, an individual prohibition order is the sanction with the most practical force — and it would follow Mintz to any future venture in money services. These are allegations in a Statement of Charges, not findings in a final order; Bitcoin Depot and Mintz have the right to contest them at an administrative hearing.
Case: In re Bitcoin Depot Operating LLC and Brandon Taylor Mintz
Agency: Washington Department of Financial Institutions, Division of Consumer Services
Case Number: C-25-4080-26-SC01
Issued: June 8, 2026
Legal Basis: Uniform Money Services Act, chapter 19.230 RCW
Bitcoin Depot, long the largest U.S. operator with a kiosk network estimated in the range of roughly 9,000 machines before it went offline, has not publicly responded to the Washington charges. Neither the company nor Mintz had filed a response on the record as of this writing, and no comment from either respondent has been located. We will update this story if a response is filed or provided.
What the State Is Asking For
The Statement of Charges is a Notice of Intent to Enter an Order, meaning DFI has investigated, made allegations, and laid out the consequences it intends to impose unless Bitcoin Depot and Mintz contest the charges at an administrative hearing.
The Director's stated intent is to revoke the company's license, bar both respondents from money transmission in Washington for ten years, impose the $1.5 million fine on Mintz, collect a $4,425 investigation fee, and recover prosecution costs to be determined at hearing.
Why Is the State Going After Mintz Personally?
Personal liability against a founder is the most consequential feature of this filing — and it is worth explaining how Washington gets there, because individual prohibition orders are not the default outcome in routine money-transmitter enforcement. Most state money-services examinations resolve at the entity level: the licensee signs a consent order, pays a fine, agrees to remediate, and the named officers are never personally sanctioned. Individual fines and industry bans are the exception, reserved for cases where the regulator concludes the violations were systemic, the responsible person was on notice, or — as here — the corporate entity is no longer a viable target for a penalty.
Washington's authority to reach Mintz comes from a specific statutory hook. Under RCW 19.230.280, a licensee is liable for violations committed by its employees, and the designated "Responsible Individual" is "responsible under the license" and "may be subjected to administrative sanctions" for the licensee's violations. In plain language: the person Bitcoin Depot named to the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS) — the multistate licensing registry — as accountable for compliance inherits the company's regulatory exposure. Mintz allegedly held that role — under both Bitcoin Depot Operating LLC and its predecessor Lux Vending LLC — from December 2020 through June 2026, spanning the entire examination period.
Why this case reaches the individual when most don't:
- The entity is in bankruptcy. Bitcoin Depot filed Chapter 11 on May 17, 2026. A revoked license and a corporate fine are largely symbolic against a debtor that is winding down. A personal fine and a personal ban are not — they attach to the individual.
- Mintz was the statutory Responsible Individual. By naming him to that role, Bitcoin Depot made him the person the Act holds accountable for the licensee's conduct. This is a statutory mechanism written into the Uniform Money Services Act — not a traditional "piercing the corporate veil" theory the regulator has to prove in court.
- The findings are framed as systemic, not clerical. DFI alleges deceptive pricing, a deficient AML program, missing disclosures across 30,000+ transactions, and inaccurate regulatory reporting — the kind of pervasive failures that support reaching the person who oversaw the program rather than a line employee.
- An entity ban is toothless once the entity is gone. The enforcement value of barring a company that has already taken its network offline is near zero. The ten-year ban only bites if it follows the individual to his next venture.
The fine itself — $1.5 million — reflects the statute's $100-per-day-per-violation structure under RCW 19.230.290, multiplied across the volume and duration of the alleged violations. With the LLC sliding into a wind-down, the only sanction that meaningfully changes anyone's future conduct is one aimed at the founder. That is the strategic logic of pursuing Mintz directly rather than settling for a paper judgment against a defunct entity.
The Pricing Allegation: Up to 42% Over Market
The most concrete consumer-facing allegation concerns Bitcoin Depot's markup. DFI alleges the company charged customers up to 42% more than the market price of virtual currency. The two framings the state uses describe the same thing from opposite directions: a markup of up to 42% over market price on the company's side, and — in the filing's own illustration — a customer who put $1,000 into a Bitcoin Depot kiosk receiving only about $580 (roughly 58 cents on the dollar) in Bitcoin at fair market value. The state attributes that example directly to its own analysis of the company's pricing.
The state also alleges Bitcoin Depot failed to provide required disclosures — including a full fee schedule, insurance status, irreversibility warnings, and fraud-risk notices — for more than 30,000 virtual currency transactions during the review period.
AML and Fraud-Monitoring Failures
The bulk of the charges describe what DFI characterizes as a deficient anti-money-laundering (AML) program. The 2025 examination covered January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2024, and the findings echo allegations regulators in other states have leveled at the operator.
Key AML allegations from the Washington examination:
- Transaction monitoring was largely reactive — conducted manually only after a currency transaction report (CTR) was filed or a due-diligence threshold was hit.
- 60% of suspicious activity reports (SARs) were filed on first-time users, which DFI says indicates a lack of active monitoring.
- The majority of fraud victims using the ATMs were over 60 years old, yet the company allegedly had no monitoring rules based on age.
- Enhanced due diligence (EDD) was allegedly not triggered for some customers until they inserted over $100,000 in cash.
- Multiple underage users were allegedly allowed to create accounts and transact.
The state also cites a list of recordkeeping and reporting lapses: at least 25 currency transaction reports filed late, incomplete or inaccurate CTRs, a delinquent FinCEN money services business renewal, inadequate funds-transfer records for transmittals of $3,000 or more, failure to maintain the required tangible net worth and surety bond, and underreported call reports — with the 2024 figures allegedly understated by roughly $6.46 million.
DFI further alleges Bitcoin Depot failed to timely report a data breach and waited until April 7, 2025 to disclose a January 13, 2023 breach-of-contract suit brought against it by Canaccord Genuity Corp. — a reporting lapse the state treats as one more example of the company's alleged failure to keep regulators informed of material events. That same Canaccord dispute resurfaces as a multimillion-dollar claim in the company's Chapter 11 case, discussed below.
The Counts
Grounds for Entry of Order (selected)
Bankruptcy Backdrop: Why the Corporate Fine Is Worthless
The Washington charges note that on or about May 17, 2026, Bitcoin Depot Operating LLC filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. The company announced in Exhibit 99.1 to its May 18, 2026 Form 8-K that its BTM network had been taken offline. Bitcoin Depot (NASDAQ: BTM), long the largest U.S. operator by kiosk count, also disclosed that Nasdaq notified it that trading of its Class A common stock and warrants would be suspended effective May 26, 2026. Brandon Mintz, the company's founder, served as its Responsible Individual through June 2026.
The timing is what makes the personal sanction the operative development here. Bitcoin Depot's assets are being sold off in the bankruptcy this week — the company's court-supervised auction is proceeding on June 29–30, the same window in which this Statement of Charges surfaces. What's left of the business is being liquidated to satisfy creditors, and the creditor stack tells you exactly how little is likely to flow back to a state regulator chasing a corporate fine. We are tracking the proceedings in our Chapter 11 docket coverage.
Major unsecured claims in the Chapter 11 case:
- ~$63 million — Legacy Vending
- ~$38.4 million — Cash Cloud (the defunct former operator behind the Coin Cloud brand)
- ~$23 million — Canaccord Genuity — the same counterparty whose January 13, 2023 breach-of-contract suit Bitcoin Depot allegedly failed to disclose to Washington regulators until April 2025
Against more than $124 million in major unsecured claims competing for whatever the auction yields, a $1.5 million Washington corporate penalty is a low-priority unsecured claim with little realistic prospect of payment. A revoked license against an entity that has already gone offline is similarly symbolic. That is precisely why the state pivoted to the founder: a ten-year industry prohibition and a $1.5 million fine against Brandon Mintz personally are not diluted by the creditor stack and do not get discharged with the company's assets.
Timeline:
- June 30, 2021: Washington issues Bitcoin Depot's money transmitter license (to predecessor Lux Vending LLC).
- 2023: Washington examination identifies net-worth, reporting, and information-security deficiencies.
- 2025: Washington examination covers Jan. 2023–Dec. 2024; identifies AML, disclosure, and recordkeeping violations.
- May 17, 2026: Bitcoin Depot files Chapter 11 in the Southern District of Texas.
- May 18, 2026: Company discloses BTM network taken offline; Nasdaq delisting initiated.
- June 8, 2026: Washington DFI issues Statement of Charges against the company and Mintz.
- June 29–30, 2026: Bitcoin Depot assets go to auction in the Chapter 11 case.
What This Means for Washington Consumers
Bitcoin Depot's kiosk network is already offline following the May bankruptcy, so there are no active Washington machines to use. But this filing is directly relevant to anyone who bought Bitcoin from a Bitcoin Depot kiosk in Washington and feels they were misled or defrauded.
If you used a Bitcoin Depot kiosk in Washington:
- You can file a complaint with the DFI Consumer Services Division, Enforcement unit, at (360) 902-8703 or csenforcecomplaints@dfi.wa.gov.
- If you sent Bitcoin to a scammer through a kiosk, report it to the FBI's IC3 (ic3.gov) and your local police — these reports feed regulatory and recovery efforts.
- If you have a financial claim against the company, watch the Chapter 11 bankruptcy docket in the Southern District of Texas for any creditor or claims-bar deadlines — and be realistic about recovery, given the size of the competing unsecured claims.
- Review our consumer protection resources for guidance on documenting losses.
What This Means for Operators
The Washington action is a warning that regulators are increasingly willing to name the individual behind the license. The state invoked RCW 19.230.280 to hold the Responsible Individual personally accountable for the licensee's alleged conduct — and is pursuing a $1.5 million fine and ten-year ban against Mintz directly. Bankruptcy of the operating entity does not extinguish that individual exposure.
That is the takeaway compliance officers should internalize: the person your company names to NMLS as its Responsible Individual is not a formality. Under statutes like Washington's, that person carries the licensee's regulatory liability and can be fined and barred personally even after the company dissolves. When the entity becomes judgment-proof — through bankruptcy, wind-down, or a creditor stack that swamps any regulatory penalty — the named individual is often the only target left standing, which makes them the most attractive one.
The substantive allegations also map closely onto the enforcement themes other operators are facing: reactive rather than proactive transaction monitoring, no age-based fraud rules despite an elderly victim base, high enhanced-due-diligence thresholds, and missing pre-transaction disclosures. The Washington filing is far from the company's only state problem. The Massachusetts Attorney General alleges more than 80% of Bitcoin Depot's $10,000-plus customers were scam victims; the Iowa Attorney General has pressed similar consumer-fraud claims across the sector; and the Missouri Attorney General folded Bitcoin Depot into its multistate civil-investigative-demand sweep of major operators. Together they substantiate the broader playbook now bearing down on the company.
Operators can review the full enforcement landscape on the operators directory, where — based on our own trust-grade methodology drawn from public enforcement records — Bitcoin Depot carries one of the lowest grades we track.
The open question is enforceability: will Washington's prohibition and fine against Mintz survive the bankruptcy, and will other states follow with their own individual-liability orders against named officers? If they do, the operative penalty in Bitcoin ATM enforcement may shift from corporate fines — increasingly worthless against insolvent operators — to personal bans that outlast any single company. Watch the DFI docket for whether Mintz requests a hearing, watch the auction results for what (if anything) is left for unsecured creditors, and watch other state regulators for whether they adopt the same playbook.